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THE CRUMBLING WALL AND FREE COMPETITION:
FORMULA FOR SUCCESS IN AMERICA'S SCHOOLS*
ALLEN M. BRABENDER
I. INTRODUCTION
Free competition has produced tremendous results in the American
economy. Yet, Americans traditionally have been reluctant to embrace free
competition when choosing which elementary or secondary schools to send
their children.' In the student education industry, state and local
governments control an overwhelming eighty-nine percent of the market.2
In fact, one could say that the government monopolizes the market.3
Schools operated by the government enjoy tremendous advantages over
non-government operated schools. For instance, government schools are
completely subsidized by tax dollars, and thus, their customers (students)
are provided with free service. The prospect of free service is something
any rational consumer cannot resist. In contrast, non-government operated
schools are either not subsidized or only partially subsidized by tax dollars.
A characteristic of monopolies, and one of the reasons the Sherman
Act4 was enacted to combat them, is that they are inefficient and unrespon-
sive to consumer demands. Many have argued that the monopolistic
* The original version of this article received third place in the Pacific Legal Foundation's
Third Annual Writing Contest for Judicial Awareness, for more information visit the Pacific Legal
Foundation's web site at http://www.pacificlegal.org.
**Allen M. Brabender, J.D., 2002, University of North Dakota School of Law, is a law clerk
to Judge Rodney S. Webb of the United States District Court for the District of North Dakota.
The author wishes to thank Professor Kathryn Rand and former North Dakota Law Review Editor
in Chief Laurel Hanson for their assistance in the production of this article.
1. THOMAS L. GOOD & JENNIFER S. BRADEN, THE GREAT SCHOOL DEBATE 90 (2000)
(stating that the school choice proposal advocated by Milton Friedman originally "fell flat because
it lacked political support"). In the 1970s, an overwhelming majority of Americans opposed
voucher plans. Id. at 95. Furthermore, politicians viewed support for voucher programs as a
political liability because of the teacher unions' steadfast opposition. Id.
2. Id. at 100.
3. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1023 (7th ed. 1999) (defining monopoly as control or
advantage obtained by one supplier or producer over the commercial market in a given region).
"[Ninety-nine percent] is enough to constitute a monopoly; it is doubtful whether sixty or sixty-
four percent is enough; and certainly thirty-three percent is not." Id. (quoting United States v.
Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 424 (2d Cir. 1945)).
4. Sherman Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2000)).
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government schools embody these undesirable characteristics. 5 The idea of
free competition and choice in education has been gaining popularity be-
cause of the government schools' substandard ability to educate America's
young. 6 School voucher programs have emerged as one method to promote
free competition and choice in education. However, implementing school
voucher programs has been complicated by the constitutionally mandated
separation between church and state because a substantial number of non-
government (private) schools are religiously affiliated.7
This article discusses the constitutionality of school voucher programs
in light of recent United States Supreme Court decisions, but the scope is
limited to the programs' constitutionality in the context of the Establishment
Clause. 8 Section II provides the history and political support of voucher
programs in the United States. Section III then explores court decisions
relevant to a legal analysis of the constitutionality of voucher programs.
Section IV applies the legal analysis to voucher programs, and section V
addresses the public policy reasons for enacting voucher programs. This
article concludes by arguing that most school voucher programs are
constitutional, and instrumental to reform ailing inner-city public schools.
II. EDUCATIONAL VOUCHER PROGRAMS: A BRIEF HISTORY
According to authors Austin Swanson and Richard King, "An educa-
tional voucher is an entitlement extended to an individual by a government
permitting that individual to receive educational services up to the maxi-
mum dollar amount specified. The holder can normally redeem the voucher
according to preference at any institution or enterprise approved by the
granting agency." 9 What King and Swanson label as an "educational
voucher" is less controversial in 2003 as President George W. Bush, and
many state governments, have proposed voucher programs even though
educational vouchers have not always been accepted by our nation's
leaders. 10
5. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Governments, Families, and Power: A Defense of
Educational Choice, 31 CONN. L. REV. 847, 849 (1999) (citing generally JOHN E. CHUBB &
TERRY M. MOE, POLITICS, MARKETS, AND AMERICA'S SCHOOLS (1990)).
6. GOOD & BRADEN, supra note I, at 95. In the 1980s, opposition to voucher programs
began to erode because of the trend toward privatization and anti-bureaucratic thinking. Id.
7. Id. at 100. Approximately eighty-five percent of private schools are religiously affiliated.
Id.
8. U.S. CONST. amend. I. Constitutional arguments can also be made in the context of the
Equal Protection Clause and state constitutions.
9. AUSTIN D. SWANSON & RICHARD A. KING, SCHOOL FINANCE: ITS POLITICS AND
ECONOMICS 414 (2d ed. 1997); see also GOOD & BRADEN, supra note 1, at 90-91.
10. The Christian Science Monitor, George W. Bush: The First 100 Days, available at http://
www.csmonitor.com/atcsmonitor/specials/100days/education.html (last visited Feb. 19, 2003).
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In 1955, economist Milton Friedman introduced the concept of school
choice to America.lH Friedman proposed an education finance system in
which families would be given a voucher to pay tuition at a public or
private school of their choice.12 This system would expose children of all
income levels to a variety of educational opportunities.13 In addition,
Friedman expected that a voucher program would motivate schools to raise
achievement levels and increase efficiency in order to compete effectively
for students. 14
Initially, the public dismissed Friedman's proposal.15  His critics
argued that the market theories did not apply to education because the
government provided it for the public good, similar to national defense.16
The emergence of the Civil Rights Movement also played a role in the early
rejection of Friedman's voucher theory.17 The term "voucher" became
synonymous with segregation because Southern states projected voucher
programs as a means to allow white families to send their children to
segregated private schools.' 8 Thus, the public was concerned with the
effect educational vouchers would have on school integration. 19
A. THE 1970s
In 1970, the United States Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO)
resurrected the school voucher movement.20 The OEO proposed a five- to
eight-year demonstration to test the effectiveness of school vouchers. 2'
However, because of the proposal's radical nature, the OEO only found one
school district in the United States that agreed to actually take part in the
experimental program.22 The school district in Alum Rock, California, only
agreed to participate in the experiment under a number of restrictions.2 3
Ultimately, the OEO deemed the Alum Rock experiment a success, but the
11. Milton Friedman, The Role of Government in Education, in ECONOMICS AND THE
PUBLIC INTEREST 123 (Robert A. Solo ed. 1955).
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. GOOD & BRADEN, supra note 1, at 90.
16. Id. at 92.
17. Michael J. Stick, Educational Vouchers: A Constitutional Analysis, 28 COLUM. J. L. &
SOC. PROBS. 423,428 (1995).
18. Id. at 427.
19. Id.
20. DAVID W. KIRKPATRICK, CHOICE IN SCHOOLING 63 (1990).
21. Id. at 63-64.
22. Id. The proposal provided more money to some students than others because the voucher
system was based on the special needs of individual students. Id.
23. Id. at 65-66.
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restrictions placed on the program led many school voucher commentators
to proclaim that it was not a "real" voucher program. 24
The Alum Rock experiment stirred up a hornet's nest of protest from
teacher unions. 25 The teacher unions' firm opposition to school choice
programs contributed to low public approval of voucher programs. 26 The
teacher unions advanced several arguments supporting their position that
vouchers were undesirable. The teacher unions argued that there was no
evidence vouchers work and that vouchers would drain much needed
funding from public schools. 27 The teacher unions also contended that even
if vouchers were effective, private schools do not have enough capacity to
accept all students, and besides that, profit in education is bad and vouchers
are unconstitutional. 28 Using these arguments, the teacher unions and other
critics were able to defeat most attempts to enact educational voucher
programs.
B. THE 1980s
In the 1980s, public approval for voucher programs began to rise as
more and more people began to see vouchers as a means to privatize educa-
tion, thus making it more efficient and effective. 29 As a result of the in-
creasing public support, elected officials began to publicly support voucher
programs. 30 The Reagan Administration tried to take advantage of the
rising public and political support for school choice by proposing national
voucher legislation. 31 However, these proposals died an early death, as the
legislation never reached the floor of Congress.32
24. Id. at 92. An example of a restriction was that no staff members could lose their job, thus
the staff as a whole "became more sensitive to the inadequacies of their peers." Id.
25. Id. at 77.
26. See GOOD & BRADEN, supra note 1, at 95 (discussing political opposition to voucher
programs in the 1970s).
27. Id. at 94; see Matthew Miller, A Bold Experiment to Fix City Schools, ATLANTIC
MONTHLY, July 1999, at 15-16, 18, 26-28, 30-31.
28. GOOD & BRADEN, supra note 1, at 94; see Miller, supra note 27, at 15-16, 18, 26-28, 30-
31.
29. KIRKPATRICK, supra note 20, at 144-45. In 1983, a Gallup poll revealed that fifty-one
percent of the public favored voucher plans, including sixty percent of those between the ages of
eighteen and twenty-nine. Id.
30. Id. Early supporters included President Ronald Reagan, Tennessee Governor Lamar
Alexander, Utah Senator Orrin Hatch, and Florida Senator Jack Gordon. Id. at 144, 146.
31. JOHN F. WRITE, THE MARKET APPROACH TO EDUCATION 35 (2000).
32. Id.
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Another reason for the rise in public approval was the change in
opinion among African-Americans. 33 Even without voucher programs, the
public schools presumably remained de facto segregated, with minority-
populated schools receiving an inferior amount of resources. 34 The inferior
amount of resources that inner-city schools were receiving led many
African-Americans to support school vouchers programs as a means to
better educate their children. 35 The opinion of many African-Americans
was further swayed by reasoning that segregation could be prohibited in
voucher programs because it was prohibited in schools. 36
C. THE 1990s
In the 1990s, political support for vouchers remained strong, but many
attempts at establishing educational voucher programs failed. Following
the Republican Revolution of 1994, Congress tried to implement several
nationwide voucher programs. 37 All of the proposed plans targeted low-
income families, and all of the programs permitted families to choose
religious schools. 38 However, the Republican-controlled Congress was
unable to muster enough political support to enact the voucher programs. 39
Educational voucher programs did not have much more success at the
state level. Voters soundly rejected voucher plans in statewide referen-
dums.40 Several state legislators proposed voucher programs, but most
proposals never made it to floor votes, and most that did were defeated.41
However, some states did manage to enact voucher programs that en-
couraged reform in ailing inner-city school districts.4 2 In 1995, Wisconsin
became the first state to enact a voucher program that included religious
33. KIRKPATRICK, supra note 20, at 78. In 1983, a Gallup poll revealed that fifty-one per-
cent of African-Americans favored voucher plans. Id. This percentage dropped to forty-six
percent in 1986. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. WITTE, supra note 31, at 35. In 1996, the Republicans attempted to add a voucher pro-
gram to the Religious Restoration and Freedom Act and to a tax reduction plan, but both attempts
were defeated. Id. In 1997, the Republican's $1 billion educational voucher plan (American
Community Renewal Act) was passed by the House, but was stalled in the Senate by a Democratic
filibuster. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 35-36. Voters in Oregon, Colorado, California, and Washington rejected educa-
tional vouchers by an almost two-to-one margin. Id. at 35.
41. Id. at 36. The legislatures of Pennsylvania, Ohio, Connecticut, Michigan, Florida,
Minnesota, and Texas rejected voucher programs. Id.
42. Id.
20031
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schools in its efforts to help reform the Milwaukee public schools. 43 Ohio
and Florida soon followed Wisconsin's lead.44
The legal challenges began almost as soon as the state legislatures of
Wisconsin, Ohio, and Florida enacted the programs.4 5 Voucher opponents
objected to the inclusion of religious schools, arguing that the Constitution
prevented the government from subsidizing religious schools through the
use of educational vouchers. 46
III. ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution declares,
"Congress shall make no law respecting the establishment of religion." 47
This provision, known as the Establishment Clause, provides a basis for
voucher opponents to challenge the constitutionality of voucher programs. 48
Therefore, an examination into the Establishment Clause's complex and
controversial history is necessary to a discussion regarding the
constitutionality of voucher programs.
A. SEPARATIONIST THEORY: BUILDING A WALL OF SEPARATION
BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE
The Supreme Court's first major decision involving an Establishment
Clause challenge in the context of education was in 1947 with the case
Everson v. Board of Education of Ewing Township.49 In Everson, a
taxpayer challenged the Ewing Board of Education's policy to reimburse
the money expended by parents of parochial school students for bus
transportation. 50  The Court found this reimbursement program
constitutional because it was a neutral, general program of social benefit
43. Id.
44. See FLA. STAT. § 229.0537 (Supp. 2003); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3313.975-79
(Anderson 2002); WIS. STAT. § 119.23 (1999 & Supp. 2002).
45. See generally Bush v. Holmes, 767 So. 2d 668 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000); Simmons-
Harris v. Goff, 711 N.E.2d 203 (Ohio 1999); Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602 (Wis. 1998).
46. See generally Bush, 767 So. 2d 668; Jackson, 578 N.W.2d 602.
47. U.S. CONST. amend. I. The Fourteenth Amendment has been interpreted to make the
First Amendment's restrictions on government applicable to the states. Cantwell v. Connecticut,
310 U.S. 296, 304-05 (1940).
48. See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 122 S. Ct. 2460, 2463 (2002).
49. 330 U.S. 1 (1947). Before Everson, the Court only discussed the Establishment Clause
in regard to religious schools indirectly, see, e.g., Vidal v. Girard's Executors, 43 U.S. (2 How.)
126 (1844); Quick Bear v. Luepp, 210 U.S. 50, 81 (1908), or evaluated aid to religious schools
under different provisions of the Constitution, see Cochran v. Louisiana Board of Education, 281
U.S. 370, 374-75 (1930).
50. Everson, 330 U.S. at 3.
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provided to all students.5' The Court analogized the policy to police and
fire protection and stated that the government could not deny busing to
some children just because they attended private religious schools.52
The Court elaborated on the minimal boundaries of the protection and
guarantees provided by the Establishment Clause.53 It quoted Thomas
Jefferson's famous words that the Framers intended the Establishment
Clause "to erect a wall of separation between Church and State."54 Jeffer-
son's "wall of separation" metaphor has often been used to describe
Supreme Court rulings after Everson.55 The Supreme Court erected a "wall
of separation" between church and state by strictly interpreting the
Establishment Clause. 56 For thirty years after Everson, the Court kept the
wall "high and impregnable." 57
B. THE LEMON TEST: MAINTAINING A WALL OF SEPARATION
BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE
1. Lemon v. Kurtzman
In 1971, the Supreme Court developed a test in Lemon v. Kurtzman58 to
determine the constitutionality of a state law being challenged under the
51. Id. at 17.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 15. According to the Court in Everson,
The 'establishment of religion' clause of the First Amendment means at least this:
Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can pass laws
which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another. Neither
can force nor influence a person to go to church against his will or force him to profess
a belief or disbelief in any religion. No person can be punished for entertaining or
professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or non-attendance. No
tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any religious activities or
institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach or
practice religion. Neither a state, nor the Federal Government can, openly or secretly,
participate in the affairs of any religious organizations or groups and vice versa. In the
words of Jefferson, the clause against the establishment of religion by law was
intended to erect 'a wall of separation between Church and State.'
Id. at 15-16 (citation omitted).
54. Id. at 16.
55. See Martha McCarthy, Religion and Education: Whither the Establishment Clause?, 75
IND. L.J. 123, 125-26 (2000).
56. See, e.g., Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 210 (1948)
(invalidating a public school program that permitted religious instructors to enter public schools
and instruct students who had requested religious instruction); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 425
(1962) (holding that a nondenominational prayer written by school board administrators and
recited daily in a public school violated the Establishment Clause); Sch. Dist. of Abington
Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223 (1963) (striking down a state statute that required
voluntary bible readings at the beginning of each school day).
57. See McCarthy, supra note 55, at 125 (quoting McCollum, 333 U.S. at 212).
58. 403 U.S. 602 (1971), aff'd, 411 U.S. 192 (1973).
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
Establishment Clause. 59 The Lemon test, as it has come to be known, has
three conditions that must be satisfied in order for a law to be
constitutional. 60 First, the law must have a secular purpose. 61 Second, the
law's primary effect "must be one that neither advances nor inhibits
religion." 62 Finally, the law may not create an excessive entanglement
between the government and religion.63
The Lemon Court applied the test and found two state laws related to
education unconstitutional. 64 A Rhode Island program that supplemented
the salaries of teachers instructing secular subjects in nonpublic schools was
found unconstitutional because it benefited the school's religious mission.65
Furthermore, the Court stated that the potential for teachers to indoctrinate
students with religious messages was too great.66 This potential danger
created the excessive entanglement that caused the Court to find the
program unconstitutional. 67
Also in Lemon, a Pennsylvania program that reimbursed nonpublic
schools for teachers' salaries and other materials used to teach secular sub-
jects was found unconstitutional. 68 In addition to the excessive entangle-
ment created by reimbursing the teachers, the Court found an additional
constitutional violation because the state provided financial aid directly to
religious schools.69 The Court stated that direct aid to religious schools is
always impermissible.70
2. Strict Application of the Lemon Test
During the 1970s, the Supreme Court regularly struck down programs
for religious schools by strictly applying the conditions set forth in
Lemon.71 The Court applied the Lemon test in Committee for Public Edu-
59. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 612 (citing Bd. of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243 (1968)).
62. Id. (citing Allen, 392 U.S. at 243).
63. Id. at 613 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'r of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)).
64. Id. at 606-11.
65. Id. at 618-20.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 620.
69. Id. at 620-21.
70. Id. at 621-22. Direct aid is impermissible because money subsidies and grants by the
government are almost always accompanied by various controls and government surveillance. Id.
at 621. The Court was particularly concerned with the government's post-audit power to evaluate
the financial records of religious organizations receiving direct aid. Id. at 621-22.
71. See, e.g., Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 365 (1975), overruled by Mitchell v. Helms,
530 U.S. 793 (2000) (holding a Pennsylvania program that loaned instructional material and
equipment directly to nonpublic schools unconstitutional); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 236
[VOL. 79:11
FORMULA FOR SUCCESS IN AMERICA'S SCHOOLS
cation v. Nyquist,72 a case that many scholars believe was the closest the
Court has ever come to deciding the constitutionality of school vouchers. 73
In Nyquist, the Court held that a tuition reimbursement and tax credit
program for low-income families violated the Establishment Clause.74 It
found that the program had the neutral purpose of raising national levels of
knowledge and competence.7 5 However, the program violated the second
prong of the Lemon test because it impermissibly advanced religion.7 6 The
Court noted that a substantial majority of schools that benefited from the
program were affiliated with the Catholic Church. 77 The program was
found to directly subsidize religious activity because it relieved schools of
significant financial burdens. 78 The Court saw the tax benefits as incentives
for parents to send children to religious schools, and thus, the program was
unconstitutional. 79
A few years after Nyquist, the Court invalidated three state programs
that provided aid to religious schools. First, in Meek v. Pittenger,80 the
Court held that a Pennsylvania program that provided disadvantaged
children in nonpublic schools with teachers, counselors, and instructional
materials 8' was unconstitutional because it created an excessive entangle-
ment between government and religion. 82 The Court was concerned that
the monitoring necessary to ensure against Establishment Clause violations
created an excessive entanglement. 83 Also of concern was the direct loan of
educational supplies, which the Court saw as benefiting the religious nature
of schools because the supplies would likely be used to teach both secular
and religious curriculum. 84
(1977), overruled by Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000) (holding an Ohio program that
loaned secular textbooks and standardized test scoring devices directly to nonpublic schools
unconstitutional).
72. 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
73. W=ITE, supra note 31, at 21.
74. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 798.
75. Id. at 795.
76. Id. at 791.
77. Id. at 768.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 786.
80. 421 U.S. 349 (1975), overruled by Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000).
81. Meek, 421 U.S. at 352-53, 365. Instructional materials were defined as photographs,
charts, sound recordings, films, or any other printed or published material of a similar nature. Id.
at 355.
82. Id. at 370.
83. Id. at 371-72. The monitoring the Court referred to involved program administrators
ensuring that personnel remained strictly committed to nonideological teaching. Id. at 372.
84. Id. at 364-66.
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Second, in Wolman v. Walter,85 the Court held an Ohio program that
purchased materials and equipment for use in religious schools was un-
constitutional. 86 The Court reasoned that materials and equipment had the
inescapable effect of advancing religious education.87 Because the very
purpose of the religious schools was to promote an integrated secular and
religious education, the teaching process was devoted to the indoctrination
of religious values and beliefs.88
Third, the Court in Aguilar v. Felton89 found that a New York program,
which sent public school teachers into religious schools to teach remedial
courses, was unconstitutional. 90 Aware of previous Supreme Court rulings,
the school district had implemented a system of monitoring that ensured the
funds would not be used to advance religious purposes.9' However, the
Court stated that this system of monitoring inevitably resulted in excessive
entanglement between the church and state because the freedom of religion
suffered when the state became enmeshed with matters of religious
significance, even when the government's purpose was secular.92
The period between Lemon and Aguilar represented the high water
mark for the Court's separationist ideology.93 The high water began to
recede in the 1980s, when the first cracks began to appear in the mythical
wall separating church from state.94 Of the four cases from the high water
mark period-Nyquist, Meek, Wolman, and Aguilar-Nyquist is the only
one that has not been expressly overruled by the Court.95 However, some
85. 433 U.S. 229 (1977), overruled by Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000).
86. Wolman, 433 U.S. at 251.
87. Id. at 250.
88. Id. at 249-50.
89. 473 U.S. 402 (1985), overruled by Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
90. Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 406-07. The companion to this case was Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473
U.S. 373 (1985).
91. Aguilar, 473 U.S. at 409. Field personnel attempted to monitor teachers by paying "at
least one unannounced visit per month" to the schools. Id. at 407. The field personnel reported to
field supervisors, who also paid unannounced visits to Title I classes in religious schools. Id.
92. Id. at 409-10. The Court stated that the freedom of religion for those who were not
devoted to the denomination receiving government aid suffered because the government was
helping one denomination over another. Id.
93. Catherine L. Crisham, Note, The Writing Is on the Wall of Separation: Why the Supreme
Court Should and Will Uphold Full-Choice School Voucher Programs, 89 GEo. L. J. 225, 238
(2000).
94. See, e.g., Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 409 (1983) (upholding a Minnesota tax
deduction for private school tuition).
95. The Court overruled Meek and Wolman in Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000), and
Aguilar in Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
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argue that even Nyquist has been undermined by subsequent Court
decisions.96
C. MUELLER V. ALLEN: THE BIRTH OF EDUCATIONAL VOUCHER
CONSTITUTIONALITY
Many argue that Mueller v. Allen,97 a case decided in 1983, under-
mined Nyquist's authority as precedent in Establishment Clause juris-
prudence. 98 In Mueller, the Court upheld a tax deduction for private school
tuition under the Lemon test.99 This tax deduction was similar to a school
voucher because parents ultimately could use the tax savings to fund their
child's private school education. 00 The Court stated that the legislature
deserved great deference where tax deductions were concerned.' 0 The tax
deduction at issue in Mueller was ruled constitutional because it was
available to all parents, regardless of whether their children attended a
religious school. 102 Channeling the aid through parents reduced the Court's
suspicion of Establishment Clause violations.103 The Court reasoned that
the Establishment Clause was not designed to protect against attenuated
financial benefits controlled by the private choices of individual parents. o4
The Mueller Court focused on the neutrality of the aid program instead
of the aid's actual effect.105 The fact that most people who claimed the tax
deduction used it for religious schools was not constitutionally important
because the law was facially neutral.106 The Court stated that with private
school tax deductions, "we are quite far removed from the dangers that
prompted the Framers to include the Establishment Clause in the Bill of
Rights." 107
96. See, e.g., Jamie Steven Kilberg, Note, Neutral and Indirect Aid: Designing a Constitu-
tional School Voucher Program Under the Supreme Court's Accommodationist Jurisprudence, 88
GEO. L.J. 739, 762 (2000); see also Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 122 S. Ct. 2460, 2472 (2002).
97. 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
98. E.g., Kilberg, supra note 96, at 762.
99. Mueller, 463 U.S. at 394-95.
100. Id. at 391. The tax deduction was "limited to actual expenses incurred for the 'tuition,
textbooks and transportation' of dependents attending elementary or secondary schools." Id.
101. Id. at 396.
102. Id. at 401-02.
103. See id. at 402.
104. Id. at 400.
105. Id. at 401.
106. Id. The Minnesota law at issue was facially neutral because it permitted taxpayers to
deduct certain educational expenses-the cost of tuition, textbooks, and transportation-from
their gross income without regard to religion. Id. at 391.
107. Id. at 399 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 694 (1970)). The "dangers"
are that government involvement in religion has throughout history caused the collapse of many
political systems. Id. at 399-400.
2003]
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
D. DISMANTLING THE WALL SEPARATING CHURCH FROM STATE
After Mueller, the Court upheld several state programs that benefited
religious schools in the face of Establishment Clause challenges. For
example, in Witters v. Washington Department of Services for the Blind,108
the Court reiterated that the Constitution does not place restrictions on
religious schools receiving general aid provided for the benefit of all
students.109 Witters concerned a program that provided state grants to train
and educate blind students.110 An otherwise qualified college student, who
planned to study religion, was denied the grant because he attended a
religious school." '
The Court reaffirmed that direct subsidies to religious schools were im-
permissible." 2 Direct subsidies are similar to cash supplements, which are
impermissible because they have the inescapable effect of advancing the
religious mission of a sectarian school. 113 The Court added that even aid to
parents or students, such as the lending of textbooks, could be termed a
direct subsidy and be found impermissible.'l 4 However, the Court held that
the Washington program was constitutional.' 5
The Court relied on four facts in deciding the program was consti-
tutional." 6 The first important fact was that the aid went to the college only
as a result of a student's genuinely independent and private choice to attend
a religious school.'17 Second, the Washington program allocated the aid
without regard to religion," 8 and third, the aid did not create an incentive to
attend a religious school."19 The final important fact the Witters Court
relied on was that the program did not provide a significant amount of aid
to religious schools.120
108. 474 U.S. 481 (1986).
109. Witters, 474 U.S. at 489; see also Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 17 (1947) (stat-
ing a general governmental program, such as busing, cannot be denied to children just because
they attend a private religious school).
110. Witters, 474 U.S. at 483.
111. Id. at 483-84. Witters was "otherwise qualified" because he met the credentials for the
program. Id. The credentials were (1) no vision or limited vision that constitutes or results in a
substantial handicap to employment, and (2) can reasonably be expected to benefit from
vocational rehabilitation services in terms of employability. Id. at 483.
112. Id. at 487.
113. Sch. Dist. of the City of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 394 (1985).
114. Witters, 474 U.S. at 487 (citing Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 248-51 (1977)).
115. Id. at 489.
116. Id. at 487-89.
117. Id. at 487.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 488.
120. Id.
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Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School Districtl2 1 represents another ex-
ample of the Court's willingness to uphold state programs that aid religious
schools. In Zobrest, the Court upheld a government program that provided
an interpreter to a deaf student who attended a religious school.122 The aid
was available to all deaf students neutrally, without regard to their re-
ligion. 123 The Court cited Mueller and Witters as precedent for the proposi-
tion that a government program that distributes benefits neutrally is not
susceptible to an Establishment Clause challenge just because religious
institutions may receive a benefit.124 The Court also found it important that
the aid did not create an incentive to attend a religious school.125 It ex-
plained that there was not an incentive because the parents had the choice to
place the child in either a secular environment or a pervasively religious
environment, and the interpreter would not add or subtract from this en-
vironment.' 26 Furthermore, the schools were not the primary beneficiaries
of the aid, and thus, the aid was constitutionally permissible.127
The Court distinguished Meek from Zobrest.128 First, the Court stated
that sending an interpreter into a private school was not a direct subsidy of
religious schools, but instead was a program designed to help handicapped
individuals.' 29 Second, the Court stated that interpreters, unlike teachers,
were required to follow ethical guidelines and "transmit everything that is
said in exactly the same way it was intended."130
The 1980s and 1990s demonstrated the Court's movement toward a
neutrality analysis and its reluctance to strictly apply the Lemon test to
Establishment Clause cases. 131 This reluctance, coupled with the Court's
failure to directly overrule the Lemon test, created confusion among the
lower courts as to when to apply the test. 132 The confusion was partly
121. 509 U.S. 1 (1993).
122. Zobrest, 509 U.S. at 14.
123. Id. at 10.
124. Id. at 8.
125. Id. at 10.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 12.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 13.
131. See Michaelle Greco Cacchillo, Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District: A Victory
For Disabled Children, A Snub For The Lemon Test, 25 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 445,461 (1994).
132. See id. at 477. Justice Scalia wrote the following in regard to the Court's invocation of
the Lemon test:
Like some ghoul in a late-night horror movie that repeatedly sits up in its grave and
shuffles abroad, after being repeatedly killed and buried, Lemon stalks our Establish-
ment Clause jurisprudence once again, frightening the little children and school
attorneys.... The secret of the Lemon test's survival is that it is so easy to kill. It is
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alleviated, but also partly aggravated, when the Court reaffirmed, yet
revised, its use of the Lemon test in Agostini v. Felton.133
E. REVISING THE LEMON TEST AND THE MOVEMENT TOWARD
NEUTRALITY
Agostini arose directly out of the Supreme Court's ruling in Aguilar v.
Felton,134 in which the Court prevented the New York City School Board
from sending public school teachers into religious school buildings to teach
remedial courses. 135 To comply with the ruling, New York schools taught
remedial courses to religious school students in trailers located near the
schools. 136 However, the cost of operating the trailers was prohibitive, so
New York schools filed a motion for relief from the Aguilar judgment.137
The case once again found its way to the Supreme Court.138 The Court
reversed Aguilar, citing significant changes in recent Establishment Clause
jurisprudence.139 It stated that the Aguilar opinion rested on four assump-
tions that were undermined in Witters and Zobrest.140 First, the Court now
assumes that public employees will dutifully follow the ethical guidelines
of their profession.141 Second, the Court no longer assumes that public em-
ployees working in religious schools creates a "symbolic union of church
and state."142 Third, the Court now considers aid to be constitutionally per-
missible and neutral if it is made as a result of genuinely independent and
private choices of individuals.143 Finally, the Court no longer assumes that
the monitoring required to ensure compliancewith statutes needs to be so
there to scare us (and our audience) when we wish it to do so, but we can command it
to return to the tomb at will .... Such a docile and useful monster is worth keeping
around, at least in a somnolent state; one never knows when one might need him.
Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Morich's Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 398-99 (1993) (Scalia, J.
concurring).
133. 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
134. Agostini, 521 U.S. at 214.
135. Id. at 210-11.
136. Id. at 213.
137. Id. at 203.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 237. The doctrine of stare decisis "does not prevent [the Supreme Court] from
overruling a previous decision when there has been a significant change in, or subsequent
development of, our constitutional law." Id. at 235-36 (citing United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S.
506, 521 (1995)).
140. Id. at 222-23.
141. Id. at 222.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 226.
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extensive as to create an excessive entanglement between church and
state.144
Even though the assumptions were undermined, Agostini reaffirmed
the general principles used to evaluate aid under the Establishment
Clause.145 For instance, the Court still examined whether the government
acted with the purpose of inhibiting or advancing religion. 146 In addition,
the Court still examined whether the aid had the effect of advancing or
inhibiting religion. 147
However, an important aspect of Agostini was that the Court redefined
the criteria used to determine whether government aid had the effect of ad-
vancing or inhibiting148 by applying a new three-factor test.149 Initially, the
Court looked to see if the government program resulted in governmental
indoctrination.150 Then the Court investigated whether the program defined
its recipients by reference to religion.151 Finally, the Court determined
whether the program created an excessive entanglement between church
and state.152 Whether this redefinition was limited to situations involving
public school employees on religious school property was not deter-
mined.153 The uncertainty that lingered as a result of the Court's failure to
decide the bounds of Agostini was clarified in Mitchell v. Helms.154
In Mitchell, a group of concerned parents challenged a Louisiana
school district's program that directed federal education assistance funds to
private religious schools155 in order to purchase educational materials such
as library books and computers.156 A plurality of the Court upheld the
program because it neither resulted in religious indoctrination by the
government nor defined its recipients by reference to religion.157
144. Id. at 222.
145. Id. The Court modified the Lemon test by examining only the purpose and effect of a
program. Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 807 (2000). However, the Court still considered
excessive entanglement under the effect prong of the test. Id. at 807-08.
146. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 222-23 (1997).
147. Id.
148. Id. at 234.
149. Id. at 230-32.
150. Id. at 230.
151. Id. at 230-31.
152. Id. at 232.
153. Helms v. Picard, 151 F.3d 347, 374 (5th Cir. 1998), vacated in part by Helms v. Cody,
No. 85-5533, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 876 (E.D. La. Jan. 28, 1997).
154. See generally Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000).
155. Brief for Respondents at 1, Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000) (No. 98-1648).
156. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 802-03.
157. Id. at 813-14.
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The plurality claimed it was applying the revised version of the
Agostini effect test.158 However, the plurality seemingly analyzed all
prongs of the test using a neutrality inquiry.159 In her concurring opinion,
Justice O'Connor criticized the plurality for reducing the test for
constitutionality to a mere test of even-handed neutrality. 160 In her opinion,
neutrality was an important factor in the analysis, but so was the diversion
of government funds for religious use. 161
Technically, the plurality decision in Mitchell is not binding on the
circuits. 162 When a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale
explaining the result enjoys the assent of five justices, "the holding of the
Court may be viewed as that position taken by those Members who
concurred in judgments on the narrowest grounds." 63 Therefore, Justice
O'Connor's concurring opinion is the precedent to be followed by the
circuits. 164
IV. APPLICATION TO RELIGIOUS SCHOOL VOUCHER
PROGRAMS
Constitutional challenges to school voucher programs that allow par-
ticipants to choose a religious school are a relatively new phenomenon
because political opposition to school choice prevented most states from en-
acting voucher programs until the mid-1990s.165 Legal challenges to those
programs arose almost immediately, but well after the Court's decisions in
Mueller, Zobrest, and Agostini. Thus, most lower courts found sufficient
support to hold religious school voucher programs constitutional. 166
158. Id. at 807-08.
159. Id. at 813-14.
160. Id. at 838-39 (O'Connor, J. concurring).
161. Id. at 840.
162. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 (1976).
163. Id. at n.15.
164. See id.
165. See supra Part 11.
166. See, e.g., Jackson v. Benson, 578 N.W.2d 602, 620 (Wis. 1998). In 1998, the
Wisconsin Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of the state's voucher program in
Jackson. Id. at 607. The court applied the Lemon test and found that the voucher program had a
secular purpose of ensuring a well-educated citizenry, which it stated was a necessity for the
political and economic health of the state. Id. at 612. The court also found that the voucher
program would not lead to an excessive entanglement between the state and religious schools, and
the program did not have the primary effect of advancing religion. Id. at 619. The court stated
that neutral programs offering educational assistance do not have the primary effect of advancing
religion. Id. at 613. Therefore, the Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of
Wisconsin's voucher program. Id. at 620; see also, e.g., Kotterman v. Killian, 972 P.2d 606, 625
(Ariz. 1999) (upholding the constitutionality of Arizona's school-choice tax credit legislation);
Bush v. Holmes, 767 So. 2d 668, 677 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000) (finding Florida's A+ tuition
scholarships constitutional on state grounds, but not discussing whether they violated the
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A. OHIO'S VOUCHER PROGRAM
The voucher program that has received the most judicial attention is the
Ohio Pilot Project Scholarship Program. In the mid-1990s, the Cleveland
School District was in a state of crisis.167 The dropout rate was more than
twice the state average and only seven percent of Cleveland eighth graders
passed a basic proficiency test. 168 Statistically, students were just as likely
to become victims of a crime on school property, as they were to graduate
on time with basic proficiency. 169 A federal judge forced the State Super-
intendent of Public Instruction to intervene,1 70 and in response, the Ohio
Legislature adopted a voucher program.171
The vouchers were redeemable at any school, including religiously
affiliated schools.172 Significantly, no public schools enrolled in the pro-
gram and eighty-two percent of participating schools were religiously
affiliated.173 The program gave low-income families priority' 74 and partici-
pating schools were subject to various anti-discrimination restrictions. 175
Otherwise, the voucher program did not place restrictions on the use of
funds available under the program.176 Shortly after the program began, a
parent, a teacher, and a pastor filed suit against the state superintendent,
challenging the constitutionality of the Pilot Program. 177
1. The Ohio Supreme Court-Simmons-Harris v. Goff
The Supreme Court of Ohio upheld the constitutionality of the voucher
program in Simmons-Harris v. Goff.178 Applying the Lemon test, the court
found that the Ohio voucher program had a secular purpose because it did
nothing more than provide scholarships to certain children, which enabled
Establishment Clause). But see Chittenden Town Sch. Dist. v. Dep't of Educ., 738 A.2d 539, 563-
64 (Vt. 1999) (invalidating on state constitutional grounds a Vermont law providing tuition
reimbursement to parents of children who attended private religiously affiliated schools).
167. Reed v. Rhodes, I F. Supp. 2d 705, 710 (N.D. Ohio 1998).
168. Daniel McGroarty, Symposium, Are School-Voucher Programs for Parochial Schools a
Good Idea?, INSIGHT, Aug. 12, 1996, at 26.
169. Id.
170. Reed, 1 F. Supp. 2d at 705.
171. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3313.974-979 (Anderson 2002).
172. Simmons-Harris v. Zelman, 54 F. Supp. 2d 725, 728 (N.D. Ohio 1999), rev'd, 122 S.
Ct. 2460 (2002).
173. Id. at 728-29.
174. Id. at 728.
175. Id. The anti-discrimination restrictions included not discriminating on the basis of race,
religion, or ethnic background; not advocating or fostering unlawful behavior; and not teaching
hatred of any person or group on the basis of race, ethnicity, national origin, or religion. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 727-28.
178. 711 N.E.2d 203 (Ohio 1999).
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them to attend an alternative school. 179 The court stated that the program
did not result in an excessive entanglement, even though schools were
required to register with the state before students could take advantage of
the voucher program.180 It was difficult for the court to understand how this
relationship resulted in an entanglement of church and state when private
religious schools were already subject to certain state standards.181
However, the court concluded that the voucher program was enacted in
violation of Ohio's State Constitution. 82 The Ohio Constitution's one-sub-
ject rule prevented attaching a program as a rider to a bill so legislators
voting on it would be unaware of the program's existence, and therefore,
not subject it to legislative scrutiny.183 State legislators then re-enacted the
voucher program to comply with the state constitution, and thereafter,
voucher opponents filed suit in federal court.184
2. The Sixth Circuit-Simmons-Harris v. Zelman
In Simmons-Harris v. Zelman,185 parents, teachers, and pastors in the
Cleveland City School District sought to enjoin the voucher program on the
ground that it violated the Establishment Clause. 86 The Sixth Circuit
upheld the district court decision, 87 analogizing the case to the Supreme
Court's decision in Committee for Public Education & Religious Liberty v.
Nyquist.188 In Nyquist, the Court held that a program, which partially
reimbursed low-income parents for private school tuition, violated the effect
prong of the Lemon test. 189 The Court invalidated the tuition program
because it did not "guarantee the separation between secular and religious
educational functions and ensure that the State supports only the former." 90
179. Goff, 711 N.E.2d at 208.
180. Id. at 211.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 216.
183. Id. at 215-16.
184. See generally Simmons-Harris v. Zelman, 72 F. Supp. 2d 834 (N.D. Ohio 1999), rev'd,
122 S. Ct. 2460 (2002).
185. 234 F.3d 945 (6th Cir. 2000), rev'd, 122 S. Ct. 2460 (2002).
186. Zelman, 234 F.3d at 950.
187. Id. at 963. On summary judgment, the district court concluded that the voucher
program violated the Establishment Clause because the lack of participating non-religious schools
deprived parents of a genuine and independent choice. Zelman, 72 F. Supp. 2d at 859. The court
also found that there were no safeguards in the voucher program to ensure they would be used
only for secular instruction and that the program criteria created incentives for students to attend
religious schools. Id. at 860.
188. Zelman, 72 F. Supp. 2d at 958-59 (comparing Comm. for Pub. Educ. for Religious
Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973)).
189. Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 785.
190. Id. at 783.
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The Sixth Circuit stated that the Ohio voucher program and the
program in Nyquist were substantially similar,191 and because Nyquist was
never overruled, it was the controlling precedent.192 Then, applying the re-
vised Agostini effect test as applied by Justice O'Connor in Mitchell, 93 the
court stated that the Ohio program was not neutral because the government
aid went primarily to religious institutions. 194 The effect of the voucher
program was to create an incentive for religious schools to participate,
while discouraging public school participation.195 Additionally, the court
noted that the program created an illusion of independent parental choice
because parents could only choose schools that were willing to participate
in the program, and in fact, most schools that participated were religiously
affiliated.9 6 Based on these factors, the court concluded that the Ohio
voucher program violated the Supreme Court's mandate that government
funds be neutrally distributed.197  Supporters of the voucher system
appealed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.198
3. The United States Supreme Court
The Supreme Court heard oral arguments for Zelman in the 2002
Spring Term. Some commentators predicted that it was highly likely the
Court would avoid deciding the constitutionality of religious school vouch-
er programs in a general sense, and would instead specifically concentrate
on the constitutional ramifications of the Ohio program.199 The consti-
tutionality of the school voucher program then would likely depend on the
particular facts surrounding the program.200 The potential constitutionally
damaging facts surrounding the Ohio program were that religious schools
191. Zelman, 234 F.3d at 958-59. The Nyquist program and the Zelman program both in-
cluded only private schools, even though both public and private schools were eligible. Id. at 959.
In Nyquist, eighty-five percent of private schools were affiliated with religion, while eighty-two
percent of private schools were religiously affiliated in Zelman. Id. Additionally, neither program
attempted to guarantee that state aid was used only for a secular purpose. Id. at 958-59.
192. Id. at 954-55. The court noted that the Supreme Court had been more lenient when up-
holding cases under the Establishment Clause. Id. at 955. However, the Court had not overruled
Nyquist so it was still good law, and because Nyquist and Zelman were similar, the Ohio voucher
program was invalidated. id.
193. Id. at 956.
194. Id. at 959-60.
195. Id. at 959.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 961.
198. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 533 U.S. 976 (2001).
199. Douglas W. Kmiec, Address at Pepperdine University School of Law Federal Judicial
Clerkship Institute (Jan. 4, 2002); see also Edward B. Foley, Judging Voucher Programs One at a
Time, 27 U. DAYTON L. REV. 1, 4-16 (2001).
200. Foley, supra note 199, at 3-4.
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made up 82% of the schools where vouchers could be redeemed, and 96%
of the students participating used vouchers to attend religious schools.20
In the summer of 2002, the Supreme Court released its decision
reversing the Sixth Circuit, and held that the Ohio voucher program did not
violate the Establishment Clause because it was "entirely neutral with
respect to religion." 20 2 The Court found it significant that the only prefer-
ence in the program was one for low-income families. 203 The program
permitting public, private, religious, and non-religious schools to participate
illustrated its neutrality. 204 The Court also found it significant that there
were "no financial incentives that skew[ed] the program toward religious
schools." 205 In fact, the Court stated the voucher program created financial
disincentives for religious schools because private schools received one-half
to one-third the assistance given to public schools.206
The Court rejected any notion that the program created a perception of
public endorsement of religion. 207 The Court made a point of stating that
"[t]hree times [it had] confronted Establishment Clause challenges to
neutral government programs that provid[ed] aid directly to a broad class of
individuals, who, in turn, direct[ed] the aid to religious.., institutions of
their own choosing[; and] [t]hree times [the Court] rejected such
challenges." 208 The Court stated that it "repeatedly recognized that no
reasonable observer would think a neutral program of private choice, where
state aid reaches religious schools solely as a result of the numerous inde-
pendent decisions by private individuals, carries with it the imprimatur of
government endorsement." 209 This argument was particularly misplaced
considering the "history and context" underlying the challenged program.210
The Court found it irrelevant that forty-six of the fifty-six (82%)
private schools participating in the program were religiously affiliated.211
This phenomenon was common to many American cities and it certainly
201. Id. at 5. Of the forty-six schools participating in the program, only ten were not
religiously affiliated. Id.
202. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 122 S. Ct. 2460, 2473 (2002).
203. Id. at 2468.
204. Id.
205. Id. (citing Witters v. Wash. Dep't of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 487-88 (1986)).
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 2466 (referring to Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 397-99 (1983); Witters, 474
U.S. at 489; and Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 236 (1997)).
209. Id. at 2468.
210. Id. at 2468-69 (referring to the low test scores and violence plaguing the Cleveland
School District).
211. Id. at 2469.
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did not arise as a result of the voucher program.2 12 The Court declared that
finding this statistic relevant would lead to an absurd result. 213  For
instance, an identical program might be constitutional in some states, like
Maine or Utah, where less than 45% of private schools are religiously
affiliated, but unconstitutional in other states like Nebraska or Kansas,
where over 90% of private schools are religiously affiliated.214
Furthermore, this statistical disparity between participating religiously
affiliated schools and non-religiously affiliated schools was explained by a
close review of the educational market in the Cleveland area, which
revealed that parents and students had a genuine and independent choice.2 1 5
In addition to the voucher program, Ohio enacted a community school
program,2 16 in which public "community schools" were operated by their
own boards, which acted autonomously from local school districts.2 1 7 Only
non-religious schools were eligible because they received direct payment
from the state for each student enrolled.2 1 8 Also, because community
schools received nearly twice as much per student when compared to
voucher schools, most non-religious schools had chosen to become
community schools.21 9 Thus, the lack of non-religious school participation
in the voucher program could be attributed to the existence of the communi-
ty school program.2 2 0 The combination of the voucher program, the com-
munity school program, and the regular public school system promoted a
genuine and independent choice for families looking to further their
children's education.22
The Court similarly found it irrelevant that ninety-six percent of the
scholarship recipients enrolled in religious schools. 2 2 It stated, "[tihe con-
stitutionality of a neutral educational aid program simply does not turn on
whether and why, in a particular area, at a particular time, most private
212. Id. at 2469-70.
213. Id. at 2470.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 2469-7 1.
216. Foley, supra note 199, at 7-8.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id. A community school in Cleveland received $4500 per student, while a voucher
school received $2250 per student. Id.
220. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 122 S. Ct. 2460, 2470-71 (2002).
221. Id. at 2471 (stating that when enrollment of children in nontraditional schools was
examined, the percentage enrolled in religious schools dropped from ninety-six percent to under
twenty percent).
222. Id.
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schools are run by religious organizations, or most recipients choose to use
the aid at a religious school." 223
Finally, the Court rejected Nyquist as precedent in cases relating to
neutral educational assistance programs that offer aid to a broad class of
individuals without regard to religion.224 Nyquist involved a New York
program that attempted to rescue religious schools from increasingly grave
fiscal problems. 225 In that case, the Court expressly withheld judgment on a
case that involved "some form of public assistance made available generally
without regard to the sectarian-nonsectarian, or public-nonpublic nature of
the institution benefited." 226 The Ohio voucher program was not an attempt
to rescue religious schools, but was a voucher program generally available
without regard to the sectarian or public nature of the institution. The Court
stated that the direct aid program in Nyquist was quite different from Ohio's
voucher program where aid was available only as a result of the private
choice of individual citizens. 227
Thus, due primarily to the facts surrounding the Ohio voucher program,
the Court upheld its constitutionality. 228 However, the Court did not create
a rule with respect to the constitutionality of voucher programs generally.229
Because of this, a more general constitutional examination of voucher
programs is warranted.
B. THE FUTURE OF VOUCHER PROGRAMS AFTER ZELMAN
Assuming the Court continues to apply the Lemon test to Establishment
Clause cases, it should find that most school voucher programs are constitu-
tionally permissible. 230 To recap, the Lemon test requires that a government
program have a (1) secular purpose and (2) an effect that does not advance
or inhibit religion by (A) resulting in government indoctrination (neutrali-
ty), (B) defining recipients by religion (independent choices), or (C)
creating an excessive entanglement between church and state. 231
223. Id.
224. Id. at 2472.
225. Comm. for Public Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 762 (1973).
226. Id. at 782 n.38.
227. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 122 S. Ct. 2460, 2472 (2002).
228. Id. at 2472-73.
229. Id.
230. Many constitutional scholars have called for the repeal of the Lemon Test. See, e.g.,
Arlin M. Adams, Perspectives: Religion and the Law: Recent Decisions by the United States
Supreme Court Concerning the Jurisprudence of Religious Freedom, 62 U. CIN. L. REV. 1581,
1582-83 (1994).
231. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 218-21 (1997).
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First, school voucher programs promote a secular purpose. 232 Voucher
programs are designed to promote choice and improve the quality of edu-
cation.233 The programs are not designed to boost attendance in religious
schools. 234 In fact, the secular purpose of educational voucher programs is
conceded in many Establishment Clause cases as courts are reluctant to
infer unconstitutional motives to states when a facial review of the statutes
exhibit a credible secular purpose. 235
Furthermore, as to the second prong of the Lemon test, school voucher
programs do not have the effect of advancing or inhibiting religion.2 36
Vouchers programs do not define receipts by religion because they require
that vouchers be made out to parents, who then endorse the checks over to
the school of their choice whether that school is secular or non-secular. 237
The Supreme Court has stated that aid is considered neutral if it is made as
a result of the genuinely independent and private choice of individuals. 238
However, the controversy over school voucher programs still arises because
voucher opponents assert that the programs have the effect of advancing
religion.239 Voucher opponents point out that a substantial majority of
private schools in the United States are affiliated with religion. 240 This fact,
they argue, supports the contention that government money is being used to
advance religious objectives by depriving parents of a genuinely
independent choice between secular and non-secular schools.241
However, this argument by voucher opponents is simplistic because in
the future, the Court most likely will address voucher cases on a fact-
specific, case-by-case basis.242  For instance, the constitutionality of a
program such as the federal Pell Grants could not be legitimately
questioned. 243 Religiously affiliated schools make up only one-third of the
participating schools of higher education; thus no one contends that Pell
Grants push college students in the direction of religious colleges. 244
232. See id. at 225-26 (noting that vouchers are no different than a paycheck, which may or
may not be used for a religious offering).
233. Id. at 229.
234. Id.
235. Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 394-95 (1983).
236. Agostini, 521 U.S. at 226.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Brief for Respondent at 9-10, Simmons-Harris v. Zelman, 122 S. Ct. 2460 (2002) (Nos.
00-1751, 00-1777, 00-1779).
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Foley, supra note 199, at 3.
243. Id.
244. Id.
20031
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
Conversely, no one could legitimately question the unconstitutional nature
of a program that replaces a state's entire system of education with a
voucher program if all private schools in the state are religiously
affiliated. 245 In the constitutional gray area, however, are the programs that
fall between these two extreme examples.
A reasonable prediction could be made that short of the extreme ex-
ample above, where all of the schools in a system are religiously affiliated,
the Court will uphold the constitutionality of voucher programs. In
Mueller, the Court held that "even where an overwhelming majority (96%)
of individual tax benefits go to parents of children in religious schools, this
fact, without more, does nothing to call into question whether parents have
exercised real choice." 246 In addition, the Court in Agostini stated that it
was unwilling "to conclude that the constitutionality of an aid program
depends on the number of sectarian school students who receive otherwise
neutral aid."247 In that case more than ninety percent of the participating
private schools were religious. 248 Thus, aid programs are not subject to
invalidation based on the number of recipients who choose to employ aid in
the parochial setting.249
What's more, voucher programs do not result in government indoctri-
nation because they distribute aid in a neutral manner. In the Ohio
program, for instance, the only eligibility requirements were that the family
reside in the school district that was or had been under a federal court order
requiring the state superintendent to manage the district and that the family
have a low income. 250 Distributing the benefits to citizens with the greatest
need posed no Establishment Clause danger.251
Additionally, religious schools do not arise as a result of voucher
programs. Therefore, it would be unconstitutional to invalidate a voucher
program, such as Ohio's, while upholding a voucher program in a
community where non-religiously affiliated schools command a larger
share of the educational market. 252 While the Establishment Clause
requires the government to be neutral towards groups of religious believers
245. Id.
246. Brief for Petitioner at 38, Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 122 S. Ct. 2460 (2002) (Nos. 00-
1751,00-1777, 00-1779); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 401 (1983).
247. Petitioner's Brief at 39, Zelman (Nos. 00-1751, 00-1777, 00-1779) (quoting Agostini v.
Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 229 (1997)).
248. Id.
249. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 122 S. Ct. 2460, 2471 (2002).
250. Petitioner's Brief at 30-31, Zelman (Nos. 00-1751, 00-1777, 00-1779).
251. Zelman, 122 S. Ct. at 2469.
252. Petitioner's Brief at 30, Zelman (Nos. 00-1751, 00-1777, 00-1779).
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and non-believers, it does not mandate that government be an adversary of
organized religion.2 53
Anti-discrimination measures built into voucher programs provide even
more evidence of their neutrality. 254 Many voucher programs require that
no participating school discriminate on the basis of race, religion, or ethnic
background.255 This anti-discrimination requirement ensures that no
children are denied equal access to education offered by particular schools
based on their religious beliefs. 256
Thus, voucher programs are neutral, like a bus ride or a school lunch.
Voucher programs are not inherently religious because, as monetary aid, a
voucher is free of content and by its very nature presents no inherent risk of
promoting religion. 257 Because educational vouchers are usable at any
institution that meets certain religiously neutral educational criteria, such
benefits are no more ideological than programs that fund bus rides or school
lunches.258
However, there is somewhat of a Catch-22 involved in the consti-
tutional evaluation of state-funded school voucher programs that allow
parents to elect to have their children attend a religiously affiliated school.
The Catch-22 concerns the excessive entanglement prong of Lemon's effect
test.259 When vouchers are given to religious schools without limits,
government money could potentially be used to advance the mission of the
church. For instance, without limits on how and where voucher money is to
be spent, religious schools could opt to drop reading and arithmetic in favor
of theology classes designed to indoctrinate students with religious values.
Conversely, when the government attempts to place limits on voucher
programs, it runs the risk of excessively entangling itself in the religious
affairs of the church.
Nevertheless, "entanglement must be 'excessive' before it runs afoul of
the Establishment Clause." 260 The government's standard regulatory prac-
tice that involves no inquiry into religious principles, no delegation of
governmental power to a religious entity, and no extravagant supervision of
253. Id.
254. Id. at 32.
255. Id. at 31.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 32.
258. Id.
259. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 613 (1971) (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'r of N.Y.,
397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)).
260. Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 233 (1997).
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the school's governance, curriculum, or day-to-day affairs does not itself
create an "excessive" entanglement. 261
Plus, state legislatures are aware of the Establishment Clause's
entanglement limitations, and they design voucher programs to comply with
those limitations. Programs that have survived constitutional challenges
share three common characteristics. The first common characteristic is that
all programs have allowed the parent, not the state, to decide which school
to send their children.262 The state transmits funds from the state coffers to
religiously affiliated schools only by way of the independent determination
of parents. 263 Consequently, "public funds are not subsidies to schools,
which are impermissible, but aid to students, which is permissible." 264
The second common characteristic is that the voucher programs do not
produce an incentive to attend a religious school, or even a private school
for that matter. 265 Voucher programs allow both private and public schools
to participate; hence, aid is distributed on a neutral basis without regard to
religion.266 "This neutrality is enhanced when public schools are among the
options or private school options are part of broader education reform." 267
Also, reports demonstrate that religious affiliation is not an important con-
sideration when parents evaluate a private school.268 Parents rank academic
quality, reputation, safety, location, and recommendations of other people
ahead of religious affiliation when choosing a school for their children. 269
The third common characteristic is that the voucher programs do not
create a continuous government presence in religiously affiliated schools.270
Legislatures have kept government controls to a minimum by only re-
quiring religious schools receiving vouchers to comply with standards al-
ready required of private schools.271 This may include standards regarding
nondiscrimination, health and safety, and minimum education.2 72 However,
voucher programs should not include any government supervision of
261. Clint Bolick & Richard D. Komer, School Choice Answers to the Most Frequently
Asked Legal Questions, available at http://www.ij.org/cases/school/faq.shtm (last visited Feb. 17,
2003).
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Brief for Petitioner at 24, Simmons-Harris v. Zelman, 122 S. Ct. 2460 (2002) (Nos. 00-
1751, 00-1777, 00-1779).
269. Id. (citing Peterson Aff. at 28-29 and Metcalf Aff. at PP10-11).
270. Bolick & Komer, supra note 261.
271. Petitioner's Brief at 22, Zelman (Nos. 00-1751, 00-1777, 00-1779).
272. Id. at 25.
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"curriculum, personnel, or administration ... [because] [a]ny program that
creates extensive involvement by the state in the schools' internal affairs is
likely to be found an unconstitutional 'excessive entanglement."' 273
In summary, courts will likely uphold most school voucher programs in
the future even though the Supreme Court is not likely to create a general
rule in regard to school voucher programs. Carefully drafted voucher pro-
grams should be able to pass the Lemon test's various prongs. At least for
the sake of inner-city school children, let us hope our nation's judiciary is
aware of the constitutional nature and social importance of most educational
voucher programs.
V. PUBLIC POLICY SUPPORTS THE USE OF SCHOOL VOUCHERS:
MOVING BEYOND THE CONSTITUTIONALITY ISSUE
Regardless of their constitutionality, school voucher programs are a
good idea. A study of school choice programs conducted by the RAND
Corporation 274 revealed many encouraging results. 275 Parental satisfaction
levels were high in virtually all voucher programs studied, and in
economics, customer satisfaction is a key indicator of quality. 276 African-
American children showed modest achievement benefits after just one or
two years when compared with student achievement in local public
schools.277 Programs designed with family income qualifications in mind
have succeeded in placing low-income, low-achieving, and minority
students into voucher schools, and voucher programs have modestly
increased racial integration levels in communities where racial isolation is
high.278
Over sixty percent of the children receiving scholarships in the Ohio
program are from families with incomes at or below the poverty line.279
"School violence, low test scores and high drop-out rates continue to claim
educational casualties, particularly among poor families whose children are
captives of the public system." 280 Only one in fourteen students in the
273. Bolick & Komer, supra note 261.
274. Brian Gill et al., Rhetoric Versus Reality, What We Know and What We Need to Know
About Vouchers and Charter Schools, available at http://wwwrand.org/publications/MR/
MR1 118 (last visited Feb. 16, 2003). RAND is a nonprofit institution that helps improve policy
and decision-making through research and analysis. Id.
275. Id.
276. Id. at xiv.
277. Id.
278. Id. at xiv-xv.
279. Simmons-Harris v. Zelman, 234 F.3d 945, 949 (6th Cir. 2000), rev'd, 122 S. Ct. 2460
(2002).
280. McGroarty, supra note 168, at 26.
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Cleveland public school system passes the twelfth grade proficiency test,
while the number of students assaulted in the city's public schools or on
public school property is also one in fourteen. 281
The lack of competition in American schools is one of the causes of the
poor performance of inner-city public schools. Before enacting its voucher
program, the Cleveland School District spent more per student than the
state average, and the district's debt-to-revenue ratio was a crippling 25%,
making it the hands-down debt leader in the state. 282 A competitive
atmosphere in the educational market would force inner-city school districts
like Cleveland to become more efficient and effective in order to remain
viable. Low-income families would be able to send their children to the
schools that they believe will provide the best education possible. This
empowerment of low-income families should inspire schools to respond
and reform, or risk losing their student population to another school.
VI. CONCLUSION
America's inner-city public schools are in a state of crisis. The crisis is
in part caused by the government's monopoly over the public education
market. The well-documented problems with America's education system
may be attributed to the government's monopoly, which is inefficient and
unresponsive to consumer demands. School choice in the form of vouchers
can be an effective tool in combating the problems of America's modem
educational system. However, voucher programs are controversial and
have faced fierce resistance from teacher unions.
Teacher unions and other voucher opponents have had the opportunity
to challenge educational voucher programs in court because most voucher
programs provide parents with the opportunity to send their children to a
religiously affiliated school. This opportunity raises potential constitutional
questions. However, the United States Supreme Court, in recent Establish-
ment Clause decisions, has upheld most religiously neutral educational pro-
grams, including Ohio's voucher program; plus, the Constitution has never
281. Id. (quoting Clint Bolick of the Institute for Justice, counsel to the pro-voucher parents
in both Wisconsin and Ohio). Additionally,
Cleveland scored the lowest of any school district in Ohio on the latest state report
card, failing to meet a single one of 27 standards for student performance. The district
was one of 69 around the state doing so poorly in 1998-99 that they were declared to
be in a state of "academic emergency."
See Janet Jebben and Mark Vosburgh, Cleveland Schools Fail All Performance Standards, PLAIN
DEALER, Dec. 23, 1999, at 1-A.
282. Reed v. Rhodes, 934 F. Supp. 1459, 1472 (N.D. Ohio 1996).
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been interpreted to require states to be adversaries of organized religion. 283
Thus, the constitutionally mandated "wall of separation" is not likely to bar
most educational voucher programs even if the programs permit parents to
send their children to religiously affiliated schools.
283. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1946) (declaring a state is not required to be an
adversary of organized religion); Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 122 S. Ct. 2460, 2460 (2002)
(upholding Ohio's school voucher program).
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